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Abstract. This study was an examination into whether the use of memory-enhancing techniques (mnemonics) in 
interviews can be helpful to distinguish truth tellers from liars. In the previous study (Izotovas et al., 2018), it was 
found that when mnemonic techniques were used in the interview immediately after the event, truth-tellers reported 
more details than liars in those immediate interviews and again after a delay. Moreover, truth-tellers, but not liars, 
showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay.
In the current experiment, participants (n = 92) were asked to read the repeated statements reported by participants in 
the Izotovas et al.’s (2018) study and decide whether the statements they read were truthful or deceptive. One group 
of participants (informed condition) received information about the findings of the previous study before reading 
the statement. The other group received no information before reading the statement (uninformed condition). After 
participants made veracity judgements, they were asked an open-ended question asking what factors influenced their 
credibility decision. Although truthful statements were judged more accurately in the informed condition (65.2%) than 
in the uninformed condition (47.8%), this difference was not significant. In both conditions deceptive statements were 
detected at chance level (52.2%). Participants who relied on the self-reported diagnostic verbal cues to deceit were 
not more accurate than participants who self-reported unreliable cues. This could happen because only the minority 
of participants (27.4%) in both conditions based their decisions on diagnostic cues to truth/deceit.
Keywords: lie detection accuracy, deception cues, verbal lie detecion, mnemonic techniques, repeated interviewing.
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Mnemoninės technikos ir melo aptikimas: tiesos ir melo atpažinimo tikslumas  
pakartotiniuose parodymuose 
Santrauka. Šiame eksperimente buvo siekiama nustatyti, ar mnemoninių (t .y. informacijos atkūrimą palengvinančių) 
technikų panaudojimas apklausų metu gali padėti atskirti tiesą sakančių ir meluojančių asmenų parodymus. Ankstes-
niame tyrime (Izotovas ir kt., 2018) buvo aptikta, kad kai skirtingos mnemonikos (t. y. konteksto atkūrimo, piešinio 
ar įvykių sekos) buvo naudojamos apklausose, atliktose iš karto po incidento, tiesą sakantys apklausiamieji pateikė 
reikšmingai daugiau skirtingų (vaizdinių, erdvinių, laiko ir veiksmo) detalių pasakojimuose tiek iš karto, tiek praėjus 
dviem savaitėms po incidento. Taip pat tiesą sakantys, tačiau ne meluojantys asmenys buvo linkę pateikti mažiau 
informacijos vėlesniuose negu ankstesniuose parodymuose.
Šio eksperimento dalyvių (n = 92) buvo prašoma perskaityti transkribuotas pakartotines Izotovo ir kitų (2018) tiriamųjų 
apklausas ir įvertinti, ar parodymai buvo teisingi, ar melagingi. Viena tyrimo dalyvių grupė (n = 46) buvo informuota 
apie Izotovo ir kitų (2018) eksperimento rezultatus, t. y. tiriamiesiems buvo pateikta instrukcija, į ką atkreipti dėmesį 
vertinant parodymų teisingumą. Kita grupė (n = 46) šios instrukcijos negavo. Kai tiriamieji įvertino, ar informacija 
buvo teisinga, ar melaginga, buvo pateiktas atviras klausimas, į kokius tiesos / melo požymius jie atsižvelgė priim-
dami sprendimus dėl perskaitytų parodymų teisingumo / melagingumo. Rezultatai parodė, kad „informuoti“ tyrimo 
dalyviai šiek tiek tiksliau (65,2 %) už „neinformuotą“ (47,8 %) grupę vertino teisingus parodymus, tačiau skirtumas 
nebuvo statistiškai reikšmingas. Abiejose grupėse aptiktas identiškas melagingų parodymų tikslumas (52,2 %). 
Didžioji dalis eksperimento dalyvių iš abiejų grupių (72,6 %) sprendimus grindė nediagnostiniais, stereotipiniais 
melo atpažinimo požymiais (pvz., asmens dvejojimas, rišlumo, nuoseklumo stoka parodymuose). Tyrimo rezultatų 
praktinės implikacijos pateikiamos straipsnyje.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: verbalinis melo aptikimas, melo požymiai, atmintis, mnemoninės technikos, pakartotinės 
apklausos.
In investigative interviews questions about the credibility of witnesses or suspects frequ-
ently arise (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Vrij, 2008, 2015). However, studies have shown 
that both laypeople and professionals are in general poor at detecting lies, with accuracy 
typically not much better than chance level when assessing speech or behaviour (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006). A meta-analysis examined possible reasons for this low accuracy rate 
(Hartwig & Bond, 2011). The most compelling reason was that cues to deception are 
typically weak. That is, liars and truth tellers often display similar (non)verbal responses. 
However, judgements can be more accurate than a chance level, if the observers rely 
on specific cues. In general, deception detection research has shown that verbal cues 
tend to be more diagnostic than non-verbal cues in discriminating truth tellers and liars 
(Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). Therefore, it 
is reasonable to expect increase in accuracy when veracity decisions are based on verbal 
cues. In an earlier study, in which police officers attempted to detect truths and lies in the 
videotaped interviews with suspects, accuracy rates positively correlated with the cues 
related to the suspect story (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004). Another study showed that high 
familiarity with a situation and use of verbal (and less use of nonverbal) content cues 
were associated with higher classification accuracy (Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, & 
Marksteiner, 2011). Similarly, recent study showed that undergraduate students and police 
officers performed at a higher level, when they had better insight into verbal cues (Bogaard 
& Meijer, 2018). Furthermore, a meta-analysis on training to detect deception revealed 
larger effects, if the training was based on verbal content cues (Hauch, Sporer, Michael, 
& Meissner, 2016). The aforementioned studies revealed the tendency that reliance on 
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stereotypical non-verbal cues (such as gaze aversion, nervousness, or fidgeting) had no 
positive effects on performance to detect deception.     
In addition, recent research has shown that higher accuracy rates can be achieved when 
specific interview techniques are used (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Vrij, Fisher, & 
Blank, 2017; Vrij & Granhag, 2012), because these techniques elicit or enhance speech 
differences between liars and truth tellers. One of the approaches is Cognitive Credibility 
Assessment (CCA; Vrij, 2018). With this approach, accuracy rates just above 70% can be 
obtained (Vrij et al., 2017). One of the elements of the CCA is encouraging interviewees 
to provide more information (Colwell, Hiscock, & Memon, 2002; Geiselman, 2012; Vrij 
et al., 2017). This can, amongst other ways, be achieved by using memory-enhancement 
techniques called ‘mnemonics’ (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). Previous studies have shown 
that the use of mnemonics may increase the verbal differences between truthful and de-
ceptive statements (Bembibre & Higueras, 2011; Hernández & Alonso-Quequty, 1997; 
Vrij et al., 2009), because truth tellers, who are recalling genuinely remembered events, 
benefit more from such memory enhancement techniques than liars, who are fabricating. 
Liars may lack the imagination or cognitive resources to report as many (plausible) details 
as truth tellers, or may be unwilling to do so out of fear that these additional details give 
leads to investigators that they can check (Vrij et al., 2017).
These differences between truth-tellers and liars often obtained using the objective 
measures, e.g. by calculating the amount of details in the statement with a statistical 
software. However, the practical problem arises when the observer (typically, practitioners 
such as police officers) needs to infer whether someone is lying or telling the truth on the 
individual basis. In the current study, we examined whether observers would be able to 
spot the enlarged objective differences between truth tellers and liars. 
Although from previous research it is known that the use of CCA interviewing tech-
niques can improve veracity judgements in single accounts (e.g. Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vern-
ham, & Brankaert, 2015), to our knowledge not much studies have been conducted to 
examine the accuracy of these judgements in repeated interviews settings. This study is a 
continuation of Izotovas et al. (2018) findings. In this experiment, the effects of different 
mnemonic techniques on immediate and delayed statements reported by truth tellers or 
liars were examined. It was found that truth tellers provided significantly more information 
than liars, both in the immediate interview, and after a two-week delay. Amongst the three 
mnemonics tested (context reinstatement, sketching and event-line), the event-line was 
the most effective mnemonic in discriminating between truthful and deceptive statements, 
achieving large effect sizes in terms of the amount of different types of detail (visual, 
spatial, temporal, and action) reported in the immediate (Cohen’s d ranging from 1.08 
to 1.47) and delayed statements (Cohen’s d ranging from 0.78 to 1.40) (Izotovas et al., 
2018). The event-line mnemonic is based on the Timeline interviewing format developed 
by Hope, Mullis, and Gabbert (2013), which is related to reproducing temporal context 
and a sequence of actions in an event.
In addition, truth tellers experienced more of a decline than liars in reporting details 
when comparing the immediate and delayed interviews (Izotovas et al., 2018). In other 
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words, truth tellers showed patterns of reporting details indicative of genuine memory 
decay/forgetting, whereas liars showed patterns of a ‘stability bias’, defined as a meta-
cognitive error to correctly understand the nature of memory decline over time (Kornell 
& Bjork, 2009).
As noted, previous research has shown that accuracy in detecting deception improves 
when people rely on the correct verbal cues (Bogaard & Meijer, 2018; Hauch et al., 2016; 
Mann et al., 2004). In the current study, we were interested whether observers’ understan-
ding of the Izotovas et al. (2018) findings was related to their lie detection performance. 
We therefore informed one group of participants about the previous findings and asked 
the participants to take this into account when making their veracity judgements in the 
subsequent lie detection task. 
We tested two hypotheses. First, it was predicted that the accuracy rates in identifying 
truth tellers and liars would be higher in the informed group than in the uninformed group. 
Second, we predicted that accurate participants would rely more on the diagnostic verbal 
cues to deceit than inaccurate participants.
Method
Participants. A total of 92 volunteers participated in the study. The mean age of partici-
pants was M = 21.97 years (SD = 6.43) and 82.6% were female. Participants were recruited 
via posters, flyers, and the University’s volunteer database. Fluent English speakers were 
required to take part in the study because their task was to evaluate the verbal content of 
the statements. Participants were awarded with £5 after they completed the experiment. 
The experiment was accepted by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee of the University.
Design. A 2 (Veracity: Truthful interviewee vs deceptive interviewee) X 2 (Instruction: 
Informed group vs uninformed group) experimental design was used with Veracity and 
Instruction as between-subjects factors. Dependent variables were participant’s veracity 
judgments and the answers given to questions in a questionnaire: self-reported level of 
confidence, and perceived cues that affected their decisions. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the Informed (n = 46) and Uninformed (n = 46) groups. They were asked 
to read the statements reported either by truthful (n = 23) or by deceptive interviewees 
(n = 23). The allocation to the Veracity condition also occurred randomly. All participants 
completed the experiment individually, none of the data was gathered in groups. 
Stimulus material. Forty six verbatim transcripts (23 truthful, 23 deceptive) obtained 
from a previous study (Izotovas et al., 2018) were used in the current experiment. In that 
study participants (n = 143) watched a video-recorded staged break-in to an apartment. 
They were instructed to tell the truth or lie about the event in the video. Each participant 
was interviewed twice about the event: Immediately and after a two-week delay. At the 
beginning of the immediate interview participants were asked to report everything they 
could remember about the event (free recall phase). After this they were given one of three 
mnemonics (context reinstatement, sketch, or event-line) and asked to describe the event 
again (mnemonic phase). In the delayed interview of the previous experiment, participants 
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were asked to provide only a free recall. Only the transcripts of the 46 interviews using 
the event-line mnemonic were used in the current experiment.   
Procedure. Each participant was randomly given one of the 46 set of transcripts. They 
were informed that they would now read two statements made by one person who might 
be lying or telling the truth about an incident, a break-in into an apartment. Participants 
were also notified that the first interview was conducted immediately after the alleged 
event, and the second interview two weeks later. 
Informed group. Participants in the informed group were instructed that i) the amount 
of detail (e.g., descriptions of people and objects, spatial arrangements, events and activi-
ties) in the statement may be considered an indicator of truthfulness (that is, truth-tellers 
commonly report more details than liars), and ii) although the statements of truth tellers 
are usually richer, they tend to show a natural memory decline over time, whereas liars 
tend to report a similar amount of detail, no matter how much time has passed by since 
an event. Participants were instructed to take this into account when making their veraci-
ty judgments. The information was provided in written format to ensure all participants 
received the identical instruction. No additional instructions or trainings about detecting 
deception were provided to the informed group. 
Uninformed group. The uninformed group was only asked to read two interview 
transcripts from one interviewee and no instructions about the credibility cues was given.
After reading the two statements, all participants were asked to make a veracity jud-
gment (whether the statements were provided by a truth teller or liar). They were also 
asked to what extent they thought the statements were truthful/deceptive (1 = totally 
deceptive, 7 = totally truthful), and how confident they felt about their decision (1 = not 
at all, 7 = totally).   
The informed participants only were also asked to rate: i) the extent to which their 
decision about the credibility of the statements was based on the amount of details in the 
immediate and the delayed statements (1 = not at all, 7 = totally), and ii) the extent to 
which their decision about credibility of the statements was based on the difference in the 
amount of information provided in the immediate and the delayed statement (for truth-
tellers: decline in details; for liars: similar amount of details) (1 = not at all, 7 = totally). 
These two items were used as manipulation checks. Finally, the informed participants were 
asked in an open-ended question what other factors influenced their credibility decision. 
The uninformed participants were just asked this latter open-ended question what factors 
influenced their credibility decision.
Coding of perceived cues. Participant’s self-reported cues that affected their veracity 
decisions were classified into categories. The responses of the informed and uninformed 
groups regarding perceived cues were classified into categories. One coder, blind to veracity 
condition, made the following classification of the reported cues (some typical examples 
are provided in brackets): Richness of detail (“Detailed describing and remember colours 
and places and sequence of rooms”), Lack of detail (“The story was not very detailed with 
aspects of the area and rooms”), Change of details, contradictions (“He said in the first 
one there was two phones a Samsung, but this changed to an iPhone”), Coherent order 
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(“Making sure the order was roughly the same”), Incoherent order (“The fact that the 
events were not in the exact order”), Consistency (“The details were the same the whole 
way through which made it more convincing”), Omissions (“Admitted not remembering 
certain things after the time period, such as the card number”), Reminiscences (“Explai-
ned seeing notice boards, phones and laptops which were not previously mentioned”), 
Plausibility (“The statements seemed to be realistic”), Confidence (“The second interview 
seemed more confident”), Speech errors, hesitations (“His grammar and his stuttering 
makes him out to be not fully honest about the events”), and responses that could not match 
to any of the categories were coded as Other (“Personal experience as a witness, having 
to describe details in a stressful situation”). To measure inter-rater reliability, a second 
coder was given the list of categories and asked to allocate each response to a category. 
In total 77.4% of the responses were classified into the same categories by both coders, 
showing a satisfactory inter-rater reliability. Discrepancies in coding were identified and 
resolved between the two coders.     
Based on meta-analyses and reviews of deception detection research (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vredevelt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014; Vrij, 2008), we further classified the 
perceived cues categories into reliable cues, unreliable cues, and unknown cues to truth/
deceit, see Table 1. Note that some of the same cues were classified as either reliable or 
unreliable depending on participants’ veracity decisions. For example, the cue ‘richness 
of detail’ was classified as reliable if the decision was made as truthful. However, this cue 
was treated as unreliable, if the decision was made as deceptive because large amount 
of details in a statement is considered as indication of truthfulness rather than deception 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). 
Results
Manipulation checks. When making veracity judgements, participants in the informed 
condition reported to have shown a tendency to rely on the amount of details (M = 5.52, 
SD = 1.01, 95% CI [5.24, 5.80]), and decline (for truth-tellers)/stability of details (for 
liars) between the immediate and delayed accounts (M = 5.54, SD = 1.11, 95% CI [5.24, 
5.85]) when making their veracity judgements (measured on 7-point Likert scales). These 
results indicate that participants in the informed group followed the instructions given 
to them about the verbal cues to deceit. Self-reported confidence levels about veracity 
judgements did not differ between the informed (M = 4.67, SD = 1.25, 95% CI [4.33, 
5.02]), and uninformed groups (M = 4.85, SD = 1.11, 95% CI [4.51, 5.16]), t(74) = 0.71, 
p = .483, d  = 0.15. 
Accuracy of veracity judgements. We compared the accuracy rates obtained by the 
informed and uninformed groups. In the informed group, 65.2% of truthful statements 
were correctly classified compared to 47.8% in the uninformed group. These percenta-
ges did not differ significantly from each other, χ2 (1) = 1.42, p = .234. The accuracy rate 
for deceptive statements was identical in the informed and uninformed groups: 52.2%, 
χ2 (1) = 0.00, p = 1.00. 
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In hypothesis 1, we expected the informed group to show an higher accuracy than the 
uninformed group. The results showed  accuracy figures of 58.7% (informed) and 50.0% 
(uniformed). Hence, the difference was in the predicted direction, but not statistically 
significant, χ (1, N = 92) = 0.70, p = .40.  
To further examine the accuracy of judgements in the informed and uninformed groups, 
we analysed the 7-point scale veracity scales (the extent to which the participants rated 
the statements to be deceptive/truthful). For this purpose, inaccurate truthful and accurate 
deceptive judgements were converted. For example, if a participant rated a deceptive sta-
tement as 7 totally truth, his/her answer was converted into score 1, totally incorrect, and, 
if a participant rated a deceptive statement as 1 totally lie, the answer was converted into 
score 7, totally correct. In other words, the higher the score the more correct the particip-
ants were in their responses. A independent samples t-test showed that the accuracy rates 
between the informed group (M = 4.15, SD = 1.53, 95% CI [3.68, 4.59]) and uninformed 
group (M = 3.98, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [3.53, 4.41]) did not differ significantly, t(90) = 0.54, 
p = .594, d = 0.11. These results showed no support for Hypothesis 1, although the mean 
values speak in the predicted direction. 
Judgements based on perceived deception cues. The frequencies of reported cues 
and their classification into reliable, unrelia ble, and unknown cues to truth/deceit in the 
informed and uninformed groups are shown in Table 1. 
There was a significant difference in frequencies of reported cues between the groups, 
χ2 (2) = 25.65, p = .007. In the informed group, speech errors, hesitations, 20.0% (truth 
and lie decisions combined), were the most frequently reported cue. In the uninformed 
group, consistency, 26.6% (truth and lie decisions combined), was the most frequently 
reported cue.
Table 1. Frequencies of participants in the informed and uninformed groups of self-reported 
cues to truth/deceit and their reliability
Informed group Uninformed group Total









detail Reliable 3 6.7 9 11.4 12 9.7
Plausibility Reliable 2 4.4 3 3.8 5 4.0
Reminis-
cences Reliable 1 2.2 2 2.5 3 4.3
Incoherent 
order Reliable 1 2.2 1 1.3 2 1.6
Omissions Reliable 1 2.2 1 1.3 2 1.6
Consistency Unreliable 2 4.4 20 25.3 22 17.7
Speech errors, 
hesitations Unreliable 5 11.1 3 3.8 8 10.1
Coherent 
order Unreliable 4 8.9 2 2.5 6 7.6
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Informed group Uninformed group Total







Confidence Unreliable 4 8.9 0 0.0 4 3.2




Unreliable 1 2.2 0 0 1 1.3
Other Unknown 3 6.7 0 0 3 4.3
Decision: Lie




Unreliable 4 8.9 13 10.5 17 13.7
Speech errors, 
hesitations Unreliable 4 8.9 9 11.4 13 10.5
Reminis-
cences Unreliable 2 4.4 4 7.4 6 4.8
Richness of 
detail Unreliable 0 0 5 5.1 5 4.0
Consistency Unreliable 3 6.7 1 1.3 4 3.2
Coherent 
order Unreliable 1 2.2 0 0 1 0.8
Omissions Unreliable 0 0 1 1.3 1 0.8
Other Unknown 3 6.7 1 1.3 4 3.2
When the rates of both groups and veracity decisions were combined, the distribution 
of the cues differed from chance, χ2 (11) = 70.13, p < .001, with consistency, 21.0%, speech 
errors, hesitations, 16.9%, change of details, contradictions, 14.5%, and richness of detail, 
14.5%, the most prevalent reported cues.
We then examined to which extent the participants based their decisions on reliability 
of cues. After creating three categories – reliable cues, unreliable cues and unknown cues – 
the frequencies between these categories were compared, see Table 2. Although the distri-
bution between the informed and uninformed groups differed significantly, χ2 (2) = 8.05, 
p < .018, the majority in both groups reported unreliable cues. When frequencies of both 
groups were combined, the distribution differed from chance, χ2 (2) = 90.79, p < .001, with 
unreliable cues being the most frequently reported cues across participants.   
Table 2. Frequencies of reliability of perceived cues in the informed and uninformed groups
Informed group Uninformed group Total
Perceived cues Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Reliable cues 8 17.8 19 24.0 27 21.8
Unreliable cues 31 68.9 59 74.7 90 72.6
Unknown cues 6 13.3 1 1.3 7 5.6
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We finally examined whether decisions based on reliable or unreliable cues were re-
lated to accuracy in the binary veracity judgements. For this we merged the answers for 
the uninformed and informed groups and disregarded the ‘unknown cues’ category. The 
accuracy rates between the two categories reliable and unreliable cues were compared. 
The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Frequencies of reliability of perceived cues and truth/lie accuracy rates
Decision
Accurate (truth and lie combined) Inaccurate (truth and lie combined)
Perceived cues Frequency % Frequency % 
Reliable cues 17 63.0 10 37.0
Unreliable cues 45 50.0 45 50.0
Unknown cues 6 85.7 1 14.3
Results showed that participants who mentioned reliable cues were not more accurate 
than those who mentioned unreliable cues, χ2 (1) = 1.40, p = .237. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
was not supported.
Discussion
In the current study, we found that the informed and uninformed participants were not 
statistically significantly different in their veracity judgements. One possible explanation 
is that the instruction we gave to the informed group was not effective to achieve im-
provements in deception detection accuracy. Previous training in interviewing to detect 
deception resulted in enhanced accuracy, but it involved at least a few hours of training 
(including theoretical information about reliable and unreliable cues to deception, practical 
examples, exercises, and feedback on trainees’ performance; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, 
& Kronkvist, 2006; Luke et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2015), considerably longer than brief 
instruction participants in the current study received.
Although participants in the informed group indicated that they relied on the infor-
mation provided in the instruction, their accuracy was not higher than participants in the 
uninformed group. However, the self-reported cues showed that the majority of partici-
pants relied on unreliable cues, including the informed ones. This finding is consistent 
with previous research that shows that lay people and practitioners tend to hold incorrect 
beliefs about deception (Global Deception Research Team, 2006; Strömwall, Granhag, & 
Granhag, 2004; Vrij, 2008). The results for the informed group support that such views 
are difficult to change. 
Different explanations have been proposed about the origin of the incorrect beliefs to 
deception (Hartwig & Granhag, 2015; Vrij, 2008). For example, the moral explanation 
refers to the stereotypical view that lying is bad. If lying is bad, then people should feel 
ashamed and/or nervous about it and, therefore, display signs of nervousness (e.g., commit 
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speech errors) (DePaulo et al., 2003). The current study showed that signs related to ner-
vousness (speech errors, hesitations) were amongst the most prevalent cues mentioned by 
participants. In addition, the exposure explanation suggests that stereotypical behaviours 
associated with the deception (one example is ‘consistency’, and many participants reported 
to have relied on this cue) are prominent in the popular media (Vrij & Granhag, 2007). For 
example, a popular crime drama TV series ‘Lie to Me’ depicted the main character as a 
highly skilful security officer in detecting deception. However, many of the interviewing 
tactics and ‘signs of deception’ shown in these series were not consistent with scientific 
evidence (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij & Granhag, 2012).
Reliability of the reported cues was also not related to the accuracy of judgements. 
That is, participants who reported reliable cues were as inaccurate as participants who 
reported unreliable cues. This result could perhaps best explained by the finding that the 
number of reported reliable cues was very low in general.
One limitation of this study was that lay people, mostly students, took part in it. It is 
unknown how professionals (e.g., police officers) would perform in this study. In addition, 
participants were given only brief instruction about the veracity cues to base their judge-
ments on. Apart from short guidance, it is unknown how the instruction in the informed 
group was perceived. For example, how and when the observers interpreted small or large 
amount of details in the reports, what kind of details they put emphasis on while reading 
the statements, did they read the entire interviews attentively, etc. These considerations 
should be addressed in the future lie detection studies of similar nature.  
In conclusion, the current study showed that even when observers are given information 
about reliable cues to deception, they still used unreliable cues when making veracity 
judgements. Future studies could focus on examining the ways to prevent people from 
making veracity decisions based on unreliable cues. For example, training could involve 
not only informing trainees about reliable cues but also informing them about unreliable 
cues. Such training also could include information about the reasons why some cues are 
reliable and other cues are unreliable. This study contributes to the existing deception 
detection literature that veracity judgements can remain challenging, even with the use of 
effective interviewing techniques (such as mnemonics) eliciting large verbal differences 
between truth tellers and liars.  
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